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Abstract: If we want our intellectual lives to go as well as possible, should we be ‘delegating’ as
many information-gobbling tasks to our gadgets as we can? If not, then how much cognitive
outsourcing is too much, and relatedly, what kinds of considerations are relevant to determining
this? I submit that one particular dimension of intellectual flourishing that will be helpful for the
purpose of exploring such questions is that of intellectual autonomy, and in particular, what I’ll
describe as the value of one’s freedom to achieve. Several related conclusions are drawn and then
applied to recent discussions in the philosophy of education concerning education’s epistemic
aims.
1. introduction
Increasingly, cognitive tasks traditionally accomplished within in the head (or per-
haps, in the head in conjunction with pen and paper) are being ‘outsourced’ almost
entirely to extra-organismic elements of the world—and in particular, to technologi-
cal gadgetry (e.g., iPhones, smartwatches, Google Glass) with which we regularly and
uncritically interact. Cognitive scientists call this strategy cognitive offloading1, and
it’s a very effective strategy, given the kinds of gadgetry now available, for acquiring
and storing information almost immediately and with much less effort than could
have be done otherwise2.
1See, for example, Dror and Harnad (2008) and Clark (2008). Cognitive offloading, especially in
cases of external memory and intelligence augmentation (e.g., wearable computers, augmented and vir-
tual reality/smart environments), itself is becoming less clunky and increasingly seamless; as Michael
P. Lynch (2014) has pointed out, our gadgetry each year is becoming smaller, less conspicuous, and
seemingly less optional.
2See, for example, Risko and Dunn (2015); Risko and Gilbert (2016); Dunn and Risko (2015) for
some recentwork on cognitive offloading in the case of new technologies. See alsoCarter andHeersmink
for an topography of varieties of cognitive offloading in the case of memory technologies specifically.
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2But is cognitive offloading a good strategy for intellectually flourishing? Put an-
other way: if we want our intellectual lives to go as well as possible, should we be
‘delegating’ as many information-gobbling tasks to our gadgets as we can?
Here some caution is needed. For one thing, we don’t want to end up like the
wealthy but misguided Calvisius Sibenus, as described by Seneca the Younger, who
relied extensively on his expensive slaves to do his thinking for him3. Sibenus would
demand that his slaves memorise and recite epic poetry so that Sibenus himself, as
owner of the slaves, could receive credit for being ‘cultured while having nothing in
his head’4. Nor however do we want to end up at the other end of the spectrum, like
the hero of Emerson’s Self-Reliance5, who is disinclined to accept any information that
is not the product of individual intellectual toil.
I am going to take as a starting point that, contra Emerson, at least some cognitive
outsourcing is required in order to lead a suitably virtuous and fulfilled intellectual
life6; and (ii) contra Calvisius Sibenus, outsourcing can be taken too far, in such a
way that it undermines intellectual flourishing. Accordingly, the broad question that
will be of interest in what follows is: from the perspective from which we care about
our intellectual lives going well, just how much cognitive outsourcing is too much?
Relatedly, what kinds of considerations are relevant to determining this?
As I’ll suggest, one dimension of intellectual flourishing which is of particular
interest in exploring such questions is that of intellectual autonomy, and in particular,
what I’ll describe as the value of one’s freedom to achieve.
Here is the plan for the paper. §2 explores the relationship between intellectual
flourishing and autonomy with reference to two specific kinds of cases of cognitive
offloading involving smartphone apps and SATNAVS. §3 motivates the view that the
most fruitful way to articulate the kind of challenge that cognitive offloading poses to
autonomy is by restricting our freedom to achieve. In order to spell out this challenge
properly and how it might potentially be overcome, I engage in this section in detail
with some of the literature on achievement, effort, and perfectionism, with particular
focus on recent work by Gwen Bradford (2013; 2015a; 2015b). §4 applies some of the
lessons from §3 to issues in the philosophy of education concerning the virtue and
critical thinking aims and raises some new puzzles.
3For an excellent discussion of Calvisius Sibenus in the context of cognitive outsourcing and ex-
tended cognition, see Wheeler (2017).
4Seneca, Epistulae morales ad Lucilium.
5See, along with Self-Reliance (1841/2012, e.g., 55) also Emerson’s depiction of intellectual self-
reliance in his essay ‘The American Scholar’ (1837/1901).
6This is a point that has been made by Roberts and Wood (2007) in their discussion of virtuous
intellectual autonomy as a mean between extremes.
32. intellectual flourishing and intellectual autonomy
Intellectual flourishing is a rich notion, and any satisfactory account of intellectual
flourishing will need to be predicated upon—or at least reconcilable with—a defensi-
ble epistemic axiology—viz., with theses specifying a fundamental source or sources
of epistemic (as opposed to, say, moral, aesthetic or political) value7. And which are
the right views in epistemic axiology is highly controversial, especially in recent epis-
temology8.
But we can sidestep much of the controversy here, by focusing in on a crucial pre-
condition of intellectual flourishing (whatever values are involved in specifying it)—
–which is intellectual autonomy, roughly, the capacity for intellectual self-direction—
viz., to choose for ourselves which inquiries we pursue and (within limits) the shape
they take.
Plausibly, we lack the kind of autonomy needed to flourish (at least, in our capac-
ity as epistemic agents, viz., as would-be knowers) if the role of our own agency is
significantly diminished in the way we seek and acquire epistemic goods. (Compare:
we do not regard ourselves as morally flourishing if our actions, no matter how else
they are appraised, have little to do with our own free choices and more to do with
some external manipulation9.)
Two kinds of cases, which I’ve discussed elsewhere in detail10, are useful for bring-
ing this point into sharp relief. The first kind of case concerns (in short) smartphone
apps and the illusion of control. While our smartphone apps allow us very quick
information-retrieving capabilities, they are riddled with various kinds of framing ef-
fects (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1985). This is especially the case when searching
for information via drop-downmenus and auto-complete search functions, where the
technological design decisions that influence which choices appear salient to us are
themselves not transparent. As Google design ethicist Tristan Harris (2016) puts it:
7See Pritchard (2017) for a recent overview, as well as the essays in Haddock, Millar, and Pritchard
(2009).
8For example, according to one kind of position in epistemic axiology, epistemic value monism,
there is one fundamental epistemic end such that epistemically valuable properties, processes, etc., are
explained with reference to their connection to that end. Goldman (1999) and Pritchard (2009) have
defended epistemic value truth monism as a variation of this type of view, though epistemic value knowl-
edgemonism is an increasingly popoular position, in part due to the increasing popularity of knowledge-
first approaches in epistemology. For a representative discussion of some of the issues at stake between
proponents of truth- and knowledge- value monism in epistemology, see the correspondence between
Kvanvig (2001) and David (2001). Those who deny epistemic value monism in any of its guises—e.g.,
Riggs (2009)—insist that epistemic value derives from multiple sources the epistemic value of which
themselves needn’t be accounted for in terms of their connection to other epistemic values.
9See, for example, Duff (1998) for discussion on this and related issues on the topic of moral respon-
sibility.
10See Carter (2017).
4When people are given a menu of choices, they rarely ask: “what’s not on
the menu?” “why am I being given these options and not others?” “do
I know the menu provider’s goals?” “is this menu empowering for my
original need, or are the choices actually a distraction?”
When our curiosity is satisfied, our app-assisted inquiries eventually will have ter-
minated in some new set of beliefs. These will be (thanks to a series of framing effects)
beliefs we are are guided or nudged towards (depending on the extent of the framing
effects), and when a lot of this nudging is not noticed, it becomes appropriate to ques-
tion to what extent the shape our inquiry takes is down our own control as opposed to
manipulated. The upshot of gaining information quickly via apps, thus, is that—and
to put it crudely—the specific information we end up with might be better described
as what someone else wants us to know as opposed to what we originally wanted to
know, viz., as answers to questions that were our own11.
A second kind of outsourcing case that reveals potential disconnections between
epistemic agency and information acquired via outsourcing involves the deteriorisa-
tion12 of navigational skills and SATNAV use. Roger McKinlay (2016), in a recent
article in Nature, reports studies according to which drivers relying on SATNAVS are
(in simulation tests)more inclined to drive past the same place twice without noticing,
revealing themselves to be comparatively less vigilant than those drivers relying on pa-
per maps. McKinlay’s critical conclusion is that navigational skills are atrophying as
a result of this particular kind of cognitive outsourcing (see also Maguire, Woollett
and Spiers (2016)), and the atrophying of on-board skills in turn leads to increased
dependence on SATNAVS in order to navigate.
Putting this all together, it looks as though taking advantage of at least certain
kinds of cognitive offloading possibilities—despite the fact that doing so affords us
quick information access—might potentially come at a certain price—viz., the price
of significantly disconnecting whatever epistemic goods we acquire from our own
agency.
In previous work (e.g., Carter 2017), I’ve argued that the right way to understand
the kind of prima facie threat to intellectual autonomy (and by extension, intellectual
flourishing) posed by cognitive outsourcing cases is in terms of a particular way of
thinking about intellectual self-direction. More specifically, the idea in play was that,
to the extent that framing effects (in the first kind of case) and SATNAV use (in the
second kind of case) threaten to undermine our autonomy, it is because the dimin-
11This is especially the case when questions are themselves framed via autocomplete. For discussion
of malicious external manipulation involving autocomplete functionality, see Gelernter et al. (2016).
12Whether skills are in fact, or only apparently, deteriorating is a matter of some dispute—a point I’ll
revisit later.
5ished role of agency in such cases (for different reasons) indicated that our own agency
was thereby not significantly enough shaping or directing our inquiries.
I’m now of the view that this way of setting up the problem is flawed13. It relies im-
plicitly on the supposition that the kind of connection agency must bear to the shape
one’s inquiries take that’s needed for autonomy is a connection of direct control. But
it’s not clear why this should be so. Provided that the kind of outsourcing cases con-
sidered are themselves ones where the choice to outsource to apps, SATNAVS, etc. is
itself non-coerced and not otherwise manipulated, the shape our inquiries take when
facilitated by our gadgets are at least arguably under indirect control—viz., indirectly
explained by our agency, rather than (as suggested before) not sufficiently explained
at all by our agency.
Rather than to (i) attempt to argue that direct and notmerely indirect control of the
direction of our inquiries is essential to the retention of intellectual autonomy; or (ii)
to concede that indirect control suffices and to then insist that the kinds of offloading
cases described pose no prima facie threat at all to intellectual autonomy, I will be
taking a different route entirely. I want to suggest that while cognitive offloading does
(in certain circumstances) legitimately threaten to undermine intellectual autonomy,
it does so in the main by threatening to restrict our freedom to achieve and that this is
where the more interesting action lies.
3. freedom, achievement and effort
3.1 Some thought experiments
Let’s take as a starting point the following thought experiment concerning autonomy
more generally:
Prince: Peter is a sheltered prince whom the king and queen desire to
make happywhilst at the same time keeping as safe as possible. Whenever
Peter wants something, the king and queen send slaves on errands. For
example, when he wants a material item, the slaves simply go get it for
him. When Peter wants something done (e.g., a fence painted, a song
played on the lute, a plant grown, etc.) the slaves do it for him. While
Peter is not allowed to leave his room to get anything for himself, or for
that matter to do anything himself, what he wants he gets and what he
wants done is done.
Peter, in the above scenario, lacks a certain kind of freedom. Never mind that he
can’t leave his room—that’s one freedom he obviously lacks. But Peter, despite all else
13Thanks to Emma C. Gordon for helpful conversation on this point.
6he is able to attain via the slaves, is not free to acquire anything he gets by himself.
Should this really matter, vis-a-vis his autonomy, provided he is able to get everything
he in fact wants?
This is a difficult question, but there is some good cause to think it does matter.
Here it will be helpful to briefly consider the three key components of the kind of
‘performance normativity’ framework popular in contemporary virtue epistemology
(e.g., Sosa 2007; 2015; Greco 2010), which offers a straightforward way of thinking
about how successes through ability might be valuable (for their own sake) in a way
that mere successes are not.
Performance Normativity Framework
Dimensions of evaluation thesis Any performance with an aim can be
evaluated along three dimensions: (i) whether it is successful, (ii) whether
it is skilful, and (iii) thirdly, whether the success is because of the skill.
Achievement thesis If and only if the success is because of the skill, the
performance is not merely successful, but also, an achievement.
Value thesisAchievements are finally valuable (i.e., valuable for their own
sake) in a way that mere lucky successes are not.
For example, to borrow an (abridged) example from Ernest Sosa, if we find out
(after witnessing a ballet) that a ballerina’s performance of a complicated Grand Jete,
which looked deft and impressive from the spectator’s point of view, was actually
guided by tiny invisible strings which ensured the movements would correspond per-
fectly with theGrand Jete, wewould naturally feel cheated. What wewanted to see was
an achievement, not merely successful moves disconnected entirely from any Grand-
Jete-performing ability of the ballerina. Likewise, on this model, there is something
valuable about the archer’s hitting the bullseye through skill rather than through, say,
a fortuitous gust of wind, even though both shots secure equally the aim of hitting a
bullseye.
To the extent that the foregoing is on the right track, we have a useful lens through
which to assess an important respect in which Peter in Prince is constrained. Peter
lacks the freedom to achieve, despite possessing a rather robust freedom to attain var-
ious desired ends. Even if Peter wanted to, he could not (for example) grow a plant
himself, play a song himself, paint a picture himself. The best he can hope for is (to
draw from the performance normativity framework) the equivalent of a ‘mere suc-
cess’ with respect to his respective aims, and (like arrows guided by wind and balleri-
nas controlled by strings) mere successes lack the value they would otherwise have if
connected in the right way to the subject’s relevant archery/ballet abilities. Moreover,
7Peter’s lack of autonomy in this respect—viz., his lack of a freedom to achieve—is sig-
nificant as regards his capacity to flourish. To the extent that achievement is among
the valuable aspects of human life, Peter is much worse off than he could be, as—for
him—it looks as though achievement possibility is taken off the table for him.
Let’s begin now to transpose the foregoing about Peter to the epistemological
arena. This can be done through a series of tweaks to our original case. Firstly, it
seems clear that it matters not, vis-a-vis Peter’s freedom to achieve, whether what is
doing his bidding for him is slaves as opposed to a network of computers. And nor
does it matter that he is locked in a room as opposed to prevented in some other
fashion from attaining his adopted ends through ability. Consider now the following
revised case:
Prince: Peter is not confined to his room, however, he is forced to wear
futuristic osseointegrated headgear that (i) takes as inputs his desires; and
(ii) satisfies these desires using an elaborate system of robots (rather than
slaves).
In short, if Peter’s freedom to achieve is constrained in the original case, then so it
is as well in the revised case Prince, with the room and the slaves out of the picture.
Now, let’s consider a further tweak to Prince.
Prince: Peter is not confined to his room, nor is he forced to wear futur-
istic osseointegrated headgear. However, Peter elects to enshackle him-
self with devices that do the following: for nearly anything Peter wants,
he simply enters his query into his devices, knowing it will be done im-
mediately by a network of robots.
In Prince, Peter could disencumber himself, by unshackling himself from the
devices, but so long as he wears these devices and comes to depend upon them, he is
arguably cutting himself off from the opportunity to achieve his ends. The robots will
see to that, and in such a way that has as a consequence (with respect to the perfor-
mance normativity framework) that the ends he attains are not achievements properly
creditable to him.
Now, finally, let’s add one final tweak, one that delimits the domain of the wearable
tech to the epistemological arena.
Prince: Peter is not confined to his room, nor is he forced to wear
futuristic osseointegrated headgear. However, Peter elects to enshackle
himself with devices that do the following: for nearly any information Pe-
ter wants to possess, he simply enters his query into his devices, knowing
that the gear’s network of computers will immediately find the answer.
8Now, for two observations. Firstly, on the surface, it looks as though Peter’s free-
dom to achieve his intellectual ends in Prince is constrained in a manner that is
analogous to the way his freedom to achieve his more general ends is constrained in
Prince. Secondly, Peter in Prince is in many respects just like us—for in the de-
fault case when Peter needs any item of information, he habitually inputs this query
into the gadgetry he equips himself with, a network of computers immediately finds
the answer. And that’s more or less what is nowadays normal for most of us14.
3.2 Achievement and effort
The foregoing discussion indicates that, in short, at least some now-ubiquitous forms
of cognitive offloading threaten our intellectual autonomy in a very specific way: by
constraining our freedom to achieve intellectual goods—viz., bymaking us such that the
cognitive successes we characteristically and effortlessly attain (e.g., when our gad-
gets quickly deliver to us the informational responses to our queries) are not cognitive
achievements any more than is Sosa’s ballerina’s performance of the Grand Jete, as
guided by strings.
However, an objection to this reading of the landscape lies waiting in the wings.
But our freedom to achieve intellectual goods is not constrained by cognitive outsourc-
ing. After all, we are exercising our information-gathering abilities, even if mini-
mal, by (for example) Googling for our answers or relying on SATNAVs to navigate.
Granted, the ability to Google properly and consult and operate a SATNAV properly
is not particularly difficult to acquire andmaintain, and such abilities can be exercised
with little to no effort on our part. But the acquisition of information in these cases
constitutes a manifestation of (sufficient enough) ability nonetheless.
While this line of thought would seem to comport with the performance norma-
tivity framework sketched in §3.1 provided any kind of success (no matter how easy)
through ability suffices for achievement15, there is a very natural counterreply here,
one that we find in different ways in work by Thomas Hurka (1993), Douglas Port-
more (2007) and in particular Gwen Bradford (2013; 2015) and which deserves some
sustained attention. The guiding insight is that effort is indispensable to achievement.
Bradford’s (2015a; 2015b; 2016) viewhere is themost detailed. According toBrad-
ford, all achievements have a process, which culminates in a product, and the process
14See, for example, Carter et al. (2018), Carter et al. (eds.) (2014; 2017), Lynch (2016), Heersmink
and Carter (2017) for some representative discussions. See also Palermos (2016) for a discussion of
distributed offloading.
15On one way of dealing with this issue, due to Pritchard, we can distinguish weak from strong
achievements, where the former merely need to involve competent causation and that latter must in-
volve overcoming difficulty or exhibiting significant skill. Cf., Carter and Gordon (2014) for critical
discussion.
9itself must be difficult to some sufficient degree. As she puts it, ‘if running a marathon
and writing a novel were easy, we wouldn’t be inclined to call them achievements
(2013, 205)’. Finally, the difficult process has to be non-accidentally connected to
the product such that it is creditable to the agent’s efforts—a condition Bradford calls
‘competent causation’. This view is in many respects compatible with the performance
normativity account of achievement outlined in §3.1, with the caveat that the process
in question must be difficult. And difficulty itself, on Bradford’s proposal, is a matter
of requiring effort which itself is understood in terms of a significant exertion of the
will16.
If Bradford is right that achievements must be difficult, where difficulty is con-
strued as involving significant level of effort, then the observation that gadget-clad
information seekers retain a ‘freedom to easy achievements’ despite cutting them-
selves off from more difficult achievements is a nonstarter (as ‘easy achievements’
aren’t genuine achievements on Bradford’s view), and the prima facie tension between
offloading and (genuine) achievement remains.
3.3 The Kasparov reply
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the difficulty element of Bradford’s line on
achievement is assumed. Providedwedonot dispute that cognitive offloading requires
little effort, is there any silver lining?
Let’s consider at this juncture a strand of thinking that has been advanced in a
recent book by chess grandmaster and political activist Garry Kasparov, entitledDeep
Thinking: Where Machine Intelligence Ends and Human Creativity Begins (2017). In
1997, Kasparov became the first world chess champion to lose a match to a computer,
IBM’s Deep Blue17. Although Kasparov’s initial reaction to the defeat was bitter, he
has now 20 years later made peace with what he takes to be technology’s place in an
overall advantageous division of intellectual labour:
Let’s look at this historical process. Machines that replace manual labor,
they have allowed us to focus on developing our minds. More intelligent
machines, I understand that they will take over more menial aspects of
cognition and will elevate our lives towards curiosity, creativity, beauty,
joy, you can continue this line18
16Hurka (1993) by contrast takes the significance of difficulty to be a matter of complexity in the
exercise of practical reason, as opposed to exertion of the will. For a helpful overview of these differences,
see Bradford (2015b).
17See, for example, http://time.com/3705316/deep-blue-kasparov.
18For the full interview, see https://medium.com/conversations-with-tyler/
garry-kasparov-tyler-cowen-chess-iq-ai-putin-3bf28baf4dba.
10
Kasparov’s thinking here would seem to furnish some cause for optimism even if
our freedom to achieve is significantly restricted through cognitive offloading. The
Kasparov-inspired line, relevant to our purposes, can (with some adjustments) be
stated as follows: whilst cognitive offloading will generally involve foregoing the pos-
sibility of achieving certain kinds of intellectual goods—i.e., those goods characteristic
of simple information gathering—this is an acceptable loss because such offloading at
the same time allows for greater opportunities to achieve other more significant intel-
lectual goods—viz., perhaps those predicated upon the exercise of creativity19.
This line is certainly interesting, though when submitted to scrutiny, several prob-
lematic issues emerge. For one thing, the aspects of our cognitive lives which are ‘me-
nial’ and ‘non-menial’ do not align so naturally as Kasparov seems to suppose with
what is offloadable and what is not. For example, as the literature on extended cogni-
tion in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science suggests, aspects of human life
previously taken to be distinctively human aspects (e.g., our narrative sense of self-
hood (e.g., Heersmink 2016; 2017), sophisticated emotionswith cognitive dimensions
(e.g., Carter, Gordon and Palermos 2016; Krueger 2014; Slaby 2014) are already such
that their material realisers arguably criss-cross the boundaries of the brain and arti-
facts in the world we interact with. At least, if cognition itself can be partly realised by
extraorganismic artifacts (as per extended cognition, e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998),
it’s hard to see why any particular dimensions of cognising such as creativity and cu-
riosity, to use some examples Kasparov offers, would be immune to this outsourcing.
Of course, the Kasparov line according to which outsourcing the menial tasks to tech-
nology allows us to ‘elevate our lives towards curiosity, creativity, beauty, joy’ could
be re-envisaged so that these elevated goods are themselves understood as potentially
realisable through mechanisms of offloading20. But on such a re-imagining of the
view, it is less clear how this constitutes any kind of optimism, at least so long as we
are excluding (a la Bradford) from the realm of achievements anything that does not
involve significant effort. After all, if we could bring creativity and the like under the
umbrella of the effortless, then we are not foregoing the opportunity to achievemenial
intellectual goods for the sake of achieving higher goods at all.
Of course, a proponent of the Kasparov line could potentially counter here by
insisting that whilst menial tasks can be entirely offloaded to our gadgets, the more
‘elevated’ intellectual activities can only be partially offloaded but never fully offloaded
and that this fact is sufficient for rendering the more elevated intellectual activities as
19Thanks to Christoph Kelp for helpful discussion on this point, and for suggesting this kind of line
as a possible move.
20It is difficult to make any empirical predictions on this point; the philosophical conjecture here is
that it seems at least conceivable. Put another way, there does not seem to be an obvious in principle
barrier to offloading these kinds of activities through certain kinds of technology, perhaps, technology
that we have not yet conceived of. Thanks to a referee for suggesting clarification on this point.
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not the sort of thing that would in principle be effortless and thus outside the scope
of Bradford-style achievement when they succeed. Even if this were granted, though,
the point would be at most a highly contingent one; for even if, for example, some
intellectual activities can only be partially offloaded at present, there is no good reason
to think that this would remain the case if our technological capabilities continue to
advance at approximately the present rate.
3.4 Achievement, effort and perfectionism
Rather than to simply grant Bradford’s difficulty/effort condition on achievement and
make peace with the prima facie threat to the freedom to achieve posed by offloading
by availing ourselves to the kind of thinking suggested by Kasparov, I think that a
more promising strategy will be to call into question Bradford’s claim that effort and
difficulty are as indispensable to valuable achievements as she has suggested. For if
it turns out that this claim doesn’t hold up to scrutiny, then the threat that cognitive
offloading poses to intellectual autonomy (vis-a-vis the freedom to achieve) isn’t as
direct as it would seem to be with Bradford’s view in the background.
I think there are two central lines of resistance to take the difficulty/effort condi-
tion on achievement. One such problem is highlighted in prodigy cases. When the
young Mozart sits down to the piano and effortlessly plays a beautiful piano piece
through what might be best described as natural or innate skill, there is no substantial
level of effort on display at any point in the process of Mozart’s playing the piece. And
nor, in such prodigy cases, is any effort retroindicated as it often is when an effort-
less performance is predicated upon effortful practice. Considerations such as these
have led Duncan Pritchard (2009; 2010) in various places to have suggested that in
cases where valuable achievements aren’t valuable because of difficulty they might be
nonetheless simply through the display of high levels of skill.
Bradford (2013, 219-21; 2015b, §2.2) has indicated some sensitivity to this kind
of worry and has canvassed some potential replies. Even if we assume for the sake of
argument that the difficulty/effort condition on achievement can ultimately be recon-
ciled with such cases, there is I think a more interesting and pressing line of critique
worth developing. Here it will be helpful to consider Bradford’s own rhetorical ques-
tion:
[…] all achievements are characterized by difficulty, and this is a ground
of their value. Difficulty, I have claimed, is a matter of exerting the will.
But what’s so good about that?
What’s needed is a clear reason to think that exerting the will en route to some
success, as we do when significant effort is on display when performing a difficult
12
task, constitutes a better or more valuable state of affairs than, say, attaining the suc-
cess having never exerting the will at all. Any such story will at some point need to
explicitly connect exertions of the will with value.
Bradford at this juncture appeals to a certain kind of perfectionist theory of well-
being, where perfectionism is the view that human well-being is a matter of the exer-
cise of characteristically human capacities21. As neo-Aristotelian perfectionistThomas
Hurka (1993) articulates the position generally construed, perfectionism
[…] [S]tarts from an account of the good life, or the intrinsically desirable
life. And it characterizes this life in a distinctive way. Certain properties,
it says, constitute humannature or are definitive of humanity—theymake
humans human. The good life, it then says, develops these properties
to a high degree or realizes what is central to human nature. Different
versions of the theory may disagree about what the relevant properties
are and so disagree about the content of the good life. But they share
the foundational idea that what is good, ultimately, is the development of
human nature (1993, 3).
On Bradford’s own preferred perfectionist line, (i) the will is a characteristic hu-
man capacity, and (ii) ‘engaging in difficult activity just is the excellent exercise of the
will’ (2013, 222).
Or course, onemight take issuewith perfectionism, generally stated—for example,
by appealing to well-rehearsed objections concerning elitism or inequality22. Or, one
might grant the general perfectionist thesis and dispute Bradford’s claim that the will
is a characteristic human capacity such that the exercise of it should be included in a
list of those valuable things that make up an objectively good human life.
I’ll opt for neither of these. Rather, I think that under closer consideration, there’s
cause to think that (i) and (ii) are jointly unstable. This is in short because (ii) is
plausible only if (i) is not. In more detail: the equivalence of excellent exercise of the
will with difficulty in (ii) is plausible only on a reading of (i) where the kind of will that
is distinctively human is obstacle-laden. ‘Excellence’ in the exercise of divine will, free
of obstacles, would not correspond with difficulty at all, but with some other features.
To the extent that the identity of difficulty with excellent exercise of the will in (ii) is
plausible within Bradford’s story, it must be premised upon some tacit commitment to
the view that the kind of will that’s a distinctively human capacity in (i) is not obstacle
free but obstacle-laden.
21For an survey of various forms of perfectionism, see Wall (2012). See Hurka (1993) for a notable
defence.
22See Wall (2012, §2.2 for an overview).
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But the extent to which we are obstacle laden looks entirely contingent as op-
posed to anything distinctly or essentially human. And one needn’t be a normative
transhumanist in order to accept this point23. Consider that, to the extent that the
latest high-tech innovations continue to smooth out the kinds of cognitive obstacles
that feature in the background within which the human will is situated, excellence in
the exercise of the will needn’t be associated with difficulty.
These points caution against grounding, a la Bradford, the value of achievements
in perfectionist-based considerations to do with difficulty specifically. And if that’s
right, then, even if perfectionism offers the right way to think about humanwell-being
in terms of human capacities, and even if the will is a distinctively human capacity, we
needn’t be committed to thinking that cognitive offloading, simply by making things
easier, restricts the freedom to achieve.
Instead, and more cautiously, we should suppose that cognitive offloading threat-
ens to restrict the freedom to achieve only if offloading undermines the possibility
conditions for what Bradford, no less than Sosa, Greco and other advocates of the
performance normativity model of achievement, take to be essential to something
counting as even the most minimal kind of achievement—viz., what Bradford calls
competent causation. This is the condition on achievement (outlined initially in §3.1)
that the success in question (e.g., information acquired through gadgets, in the case
of cognitive offloading) be because of the agent’s abilities.
If cognitive offloading (in the ubiquitous kinds of cases considered) imperils achieve-
ment by threatening this condition (as opposed to the difficulty/effort condition), then
we really do have scope to think that whatever cognitive gains we can make by of-
floading must be weighted against a restriction on autonomy—-viz., that (in short)
the more we capabilise ourself to attain information by surrendering our abilities, the
less free we are to achieve. However, the techno-progressive side of this coin is (also,
in gist) that if offloading is generally compatible with our cognitive abilities doing
enough explanatory work in our cognitive successes—as would be the case if our abil-
ities can supervene partly on the cognitive scaffolding we rely on24—then capabilising
ourselves to attain information quickly and effortlessly via our gadgetry wouldn’t un-
dermine our intellectual autonomy by restricting our freedom to achieve. This is the
fraught situation, in a nutshell, and it’s unfortunately not as elegant as we’d hope for.
It’s at any rate not a situation that can be adjudicated without engaging in much more
depth with the literature on extended cognition—and it is beyond the scope of what
we can do here to engage with this satisfactorily.
Nonetheless, a number of qualified conclusions have already been reached over
the course of §§2-3 about the relationship between cognitive outsourcing and auton-
23This topic will be revisited in §4.
24See in particular here Pritchard (2010) and Palermos (2014).
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omy, achievement and flourishing, and in the next section, I want to show how some
of these related conclusions have some interesting ramifications for the philosophy of
education.
4. implications for the philosophy of education
4.1 Education and intellectual virtue
According to one increasingly popular view about the epistemic aims of an education—
the intellectual virtue approach (e.g., Baehr 2013; Battaly 2006; Pritchard 2013; Kidd
2015; Tanesini 2016)—the primary aim or goal of an education is to foster intellec-
tual virtues, such as curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual
honesty.
If this approach is correct, then two implications from §3 are worth drawing at-
tention to. Firstly—and this is a point that has already been raised by Pritchard (e.g.,
2013) and Clark (2016)—offloading itself can be done with more or less epistemic hy-
giene. If our abilities or virtues include some extended abilities (e.g., externally stored
memory, as opposed tomerely biomemory), then educating for intellectual virtues in-
volves not merely educating for the kind of traits that take for granted that (in short)
cognition supervenes on processes that go on in the head. If they donot, then given the
presumption that cognitive scaffolding is widespread, some of the abilities or virtues
that should be educated for are those by which we can (through our own biologically
endowed abilities) come to manage scaffolding technologies responsibly25.
A second point, however requires revisiting a strand of Kasparov’s thinking. In
particular, recall Kasparov’s optimistically framed conjecture that intelligentmachines
will continue to take over more ‘menial aspects of cognition’ and will elevate our lives
towards curiosity, creativity, and the like. Given that intellectual character virtues
such as curiosity and creativity are precisely what proponents of the virtue aim of
education submit that we should be fostering in an education, a complex question
emerges: if these kinds of cognitive standings could be attained or realised in part
by the same kinds of intelligent machines that Kasparov would prefer be relegated to
menial aspects of cognition26, should they? If not, then the proponent of the virtue
aim has a sorting task on her hands: for it will be incumbent upon the proponent of
the virtue aim of education to determine just which virtues should not be (to put it
crudely) ‘tainted’ by offloading, and which can. If, however, no such character virtues
should be exempt in this respect, then this should be reflected in curricula design and
25See for example Pritchard (forthcoming) and Carter (2017).
26Some of these kind of possibilities were briefly sketched in §3.3.
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assessment—as there would be no principled reason to restrict the encouragement of
offloading to only some kinds of virtue-aimed activities but not others.
4.2 Education, offloading and regress
While the intellectual virtue approach to the philosophy of education places a pre-
mium on the development of cognitive abilities, the same is true of the related but
competitor critical thinking account of the aim of education (e.g., Scheffler 1989; Siegel
2003; 2013a; 2013b) according to which, as Israel Scheffler (e.g., 1989) puts it, criti-
cal thinking is ‘of first importance in the conception and organisation of educational
activities’; and (ii) the educational value that should be maximized ‘by making as per-
vasive and free as possible the free and critical quest for reasons’27.
On either of these approaches, an important question arises: what kind of intellec-
tual labour can permissibly be offloaded (in light of the virtue/critical thinking aims)
and what kind of intellectual labour cannot?
Here is one natural (albeit, rather restrictive) kind of proposal to this effect, stated
in the abstract in order to illuminate a structural dilemma: The only kind of intel-
lectual labour that is permissibly offloaded is information gathering labour—i.e., fact
finding. All other intellectual labour must not be offloaded if we are to properly fur-
ther the virtue/critical thinking aims. Or so such an envisioned proposal has it.
But given that the kind of labour involved inmanaging our offloading gadgets can
itself be done intelligently or stupidly28, a further question of immediate relevance
here is the following: can themanagement labour associated with cognitive offloading
be itself permissibly offloaded, or must it not be? We can imagine here a reply to the
effect that we cannot have cognitive offloading ‘all the way down’; at some point, there
is intellectual labour—labour associated specifically with the responsiblemanagement
of offloading technologies—which cannot be offloaded to further technologies. Such
a reply, however, should be a principled one. But howmight a non-arbitrary stopping
point be identified? These are questions that philosophers of education partial to the
view that we should educate for virtues, abilities and skills, generally speaking, must
at some point engage with. Such questions bear direct relevance to the matter of how
certain kinds of skills relevant to any form of offloading should be inculcated and
assessed.
27For a recent discussion of the critical thinking and virtue approaches to education in connection
with one another, see Kotzee et al. (2018).
28This wording is intentionally suggestive of Ryle’s (1949) regress in the Concept of Mind, however,
the dialectical goals (and targets) are importantly different.
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4.3 Education and an open future
According to Joel Feinberg (1980/2007), an education should among other things aim
to safeguard a child’s right to an open future. As he puts it, an education
[…]should equip the child with the knowledge and skills that will help
him choose whichever sort of life best fits his native endowment and
matured disposition. It should send him out in the adult world with as
many open opportunities as possible, thus maximizing his chances for
self-fulfillment (Feinberg (1980/2007, 116).
Self-fulfilment, on Feinberg’s view (e.g., 1980/2007; 1994, 318-19) can be un-
derstood as at least involving the development of personal talents that help humans
achieve self-actualization. While Feinberg’s most famous engagement with the issue
of how a child’s right to an open future might be violated in an educational context
concerns Amish education29 (e.g., 1980/2007), I want to conclude by connecting this
topic with cognitive offloading, human nature and perfectionism30.
Recall in §3 that the kind of perfectionist theories of well-being that philosophers
such as Bradford and Hurka appeal to in order to account for what sorts of things
make up a good human life (e.g., as would be specified on an objective list theory)
are predicated upon some description of human nature. As Hurka (1993, 3) put it,
the properties that ‘constitute human nature or are definitive of humanity … [which]
make humans human’ are those the development of which are to be included in a
specification of the good life. And here we see again, in Feinberg’s articulation of self-
fulfilment, as it’s relevant to articulating the right to an open future, similar appeal to
(as Feinberg 1994 puts it) ‘the development of nature’.
Accordingly, if human nature is some fixed particular way, this will have a bear-
ing on not just what kinds of things the human-nature perfectionist itemises on the
objective list of well-being (see §3), but also on what counts as restricting or respecting
an open future. Thus, a pressing question becomes: to what extent is the kind of scaf-
folding ordinarily used for cognitive offloading, including wearable and embedded
intelligence augmentation technologies, a part of human nature in the sense that is
relevant to a Feinberg-style right to an open future? Should we educate, for example,
in a way that attempts to respect a student’s right to develop the kinds of capacities
they possess in part through high-tech cognitive scaffolding, or only those they pos-
sess naturally?
One strong kind of answer here is found in the literature on transhumanism, al-
though some clarification is needed. ‘Transhumanists’ come in different stripes. Nor-
29Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972).
30For related discussion, see Carter (forthcoming).
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mative transhumanists (e.g., Huxley 1957; Clark 2012) embrace the thesis that we
should try to use the latest science in order to alter the human condition, and take
for granted that we can do so (viz., that human nature is alterable). Bioconservatives
(e.g., Mehlman 2012) maintain that human nature is essentially fixed and so reject
a key presupposition of normative transhumanism which is that we can alter human
nature. Descriptive or weak transhumanism rejects the bioconservative thesis that the
human condition is unalterable but is in principle compatible with a denial of norma-
tive transhumanism.
Even on the weak transhumanist thesis that human nature is to some extent a
fluid (non-fixed) notion, an important implication is that what counts as a right to an
open future will itself be non-fixed in that it will be hostage to changing descriptions
of what the distinctively human capacities are. To the extent that an education aims
to inculcate cognitive goods in a way that respects a child’s right to an open future,
educatorsmust be vigilant that their conception of what would be involved in violating
such a right does not become outdated31.
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